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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1 . Whether defendant i s precluded from challenging the 
jury ins t ruc t ion on attempted theft since he fa i led to challenge 
the i n s t ruc t ion a t t r i a l * 
2. Assuming defendant had objected, was the 
ins t ruc t ion on attempted theft proper. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
KIP RONALD PARKEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860068 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Kip Roland Parken, was charged with theft, a 
third degi.ee felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1978) and § 76-6-412 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of the lesser but included 
offense of attempted theft, a class A misdemeanor in a jury trial 
held December 11, 1985, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in 
and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Harlan 
Burns, Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Burns 
on January 13, 1986, to 364 days in the County Jail, the 
execution of the sentence was stayed and the defendant was placed 
on probation for one year. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the proceedings below, defendant and the State 
seemed to agree that certain events took place. Both defendant 
and w i t n e s s e s for the S t a t e t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant , who l i v e d 
in Nephi, Utah f t r a v e l l e d t o S t . George, Utah, on February 26, 
1986 (R. 106, 1 5 0 ) . Defendant drove t o S t . George in a GMC 
pickup t ruck belonging t o h i s g r a n d f a t h e r , for the purpose of 
engaging in c o n s t r u c t i o n work. 
When he a r r i v e d a t S t . George, defendant ran i n t o K.C. 
Coombs, an old schoolmate of h i s from Nephi, who i n v i t e d 
derendant t o s t ay with him in h i s apartment (R. 106, 1 5 1 ) . 
Between the evening of t he 26th and the n ight of the 29 th , 
defendant and Coombs spent a number of hours d r i v ing through the 
ranching country of Washington County in the GMC pickup (R. 76-
79 , 109, 154 -56 ) . At one poin t on t h e af te rnoon of the 27 th , 
they drove slowly pas t an area near the Arizona border , where 
rancher LeMoyne Espl in of S t . George was herd ing about 50 head of 
c a t t l e i n t o some c o r r a l s (R. 7 8 , 156) . Sometime between 11:30 
t h a t n igh t and 1:00 the fol lowing morning, defendant and Coombs 
r e tu rned and loaded s i x of the c a t t l e belonging t o Mr. Esp l in 
i n t o t h e GMC pickup (R. 80 , 1 6 3 ) . At a 7-Eleven s t o r e in 
Washington, they f i l l e d the t ruck with gas (R. 8 1 , 162) . They 
then drove along back roads through Hurr icane and onto t h e 1-15 
freeway (R. 8 1 , 162-63) . 
At aoout 2:00 a .m. , defendant and Coombs a r r i v e d a t a 
c a t t l e a u c t i o n yard in Cedar Ci ty (R. 114, 164) . There was no 
one e l s e p resen t a t t he auc t ion ya rd , and t h e two men unloaded 
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t h e Espl in c a t t l e and herded them i n t o a s t a l l (R. 114, 164) .-1 
Defendant and Coombs drove back t o St George. And a few hours 
l a t e r , at about daybreak r they re turned t o Cedar City in -t car 
owned by Coombs (R. 87 , 166-67) . They spent the morning a t the 
auc t i on yard wa i t ing for the c a t t l e to be so ld . In the 
af ternoon, Coombs was given a check for $1 ,462 .25 , from the s a l e 
of seven c a t t l e (R. 119, S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t ' s 8 - 1 0 ) . Coombs cashed 
the check at a bank in Cedar Ci ty , gave defendant $130, and they 
re tu rned to S t . George (R. 88, 167-70) . 
There appears t o have been no d i s p u t e as t o t he 
occur rence of the f or egoj nq ev ent s . The i s sue a t t r ia] was 
whether defendant was aware t h a t he and Coombs were t ak ing the 
c a t t l e without t h e owner 's permiss ion . Defendant claimed t h a t he 
had dr iven with Coombs: through the ranching a reas of Washington 
County, only because Coombs had s a i d t h a t he had wanted t o show 
defendant where he had p a r t i c i p a t e d in motorcycle d i r t - b i k e 
rac ing (R. 1 5 4 » V J ) . Defendant claimed t h a t he had no idea , as 
they drove slowly pas t the Espl in c o r r a l s , t h a t Coombs had any 
p lans t o s t e a l c a t t l e (R. 156) . He s t a t e d t h a t he had a s s i s t e d 
Coombs i11 loading the c a t t l e and t ak ing them t o Cedar City 
b e l i e v i n g t h a t t he c a t t l e belonged to a f r i end of Coombs and t h a t 
t he f r i end had au thor i zed -. take then 1H. 159). 
Defendant claimed t h a t he did not become susp ic ious t h a t the 
* Mr. Coombs t e s t i f i e d t h a t , when they a r r i v e d a t the auc t ion 
yard, they saw a cow running loose in the ya rd . The two men 
captured t h e cow and p laced i t in t he s t a l l with t he other s ix 
(R. 85 ) . Records kept by the auc t ion yard e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t 
Coombs was indeed paid for the s a l e of seven c a t t l e (S t a t e 1 s 
e x h i b i t s 8 -10) . 
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c a t t l e were s to len , un t i l he saw that the check from the auction 
yard was made out to Mr. Coombs (R. 167-68). 
The S ta te cal led K.C. Coombs whose story was much 
di f ferent than defendant ' s . Coombs t e s t i f i e d t h a t , while they 
were driving through the ranching lands of Washington County, he 
to ld defendant his plan to s tea l c a t t l e and se l l them at an 
auction (R. 77) . Defendant agreed to pa r t i c ipa t e in the scheme 
and expressed a desi re tha t they be careful , because he was on 
probation from an e a r l i e r conviction and could not afford to be 
caught (R. 82-84). Coombs said tha t they drove through ranching 
areas for four to five hours, and defendant helped him to look 
for c a t t l e tha t were heavyset and did not have obvious branding 
marks (R. 83-b5 , 109). Coombs said tha t he gave defendant 
$250.00 for his pa r t i c ipa t ion in the theft—$130.00 on the day of 
the auction, and the remaining amount during the following week 
(R. 88). 
In cross-examining defendant, the Sta te pointed to a 
number of factors suggesting that defendant was not a r e l i a b l e 
witness and t ha t h is story was not c red ib le . Defendant admitted, 
for example, tha t he had been convicted of a crime of dishonesty, 
forgery (R. 177). Defendant himself had t e s t i f i e d tha t he and 
Coombs had driven slowly past the Esplin cor ra l s on February 
27th, and the Sta te pointed out how unlikely i t was t h a t , in 
taking c a t t l e from those same cor ra l s on the night of that same 
day, defendant could have been unaware tha t he was taking c a t t l e 
without the owner's permission (R. 178-79). Defendant further 
conceded tha t the taking had occurred l a t e at night and t ha t they 
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had f o l l o w e d o b s c u r e back r o a d s t o r e a c h t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n (R. 
1 7 9 ) . 
Having h e a r d t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t 
of g u i l t y t o s i x c o u n t s of a t t e m p t e d t h e f t ; K . 1-LI-J .D) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n on 
a t t e m p t e d t h e f t and t h u s i s p r e c l u d e d from a r g u i n g on a p p e a l t h a t 
t h e j u r y cou ld not f imi him g u i l t y of a t t e m p t e d t h e f t . F u r t h e r , 
such an i n s t r u c t i o n i s no t of such n a t u r e so a s t o j u s t i f y 
invoKing t h e p l a i n e r r o r r u l e . 
Assuming d e f e n d a n t had t i m e l y o b j e c t e d , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n 
on a t t e m p t was p r o p e r l y g iven s i n c e one can be c o n v i c t e d of 
a t t e m p t a l t h o u g h an a c t i s consummated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT AT TRIAL TO 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON ATTEMPT PRECLUDES 
HIS CHALLENGING IT FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. 
Defendant a r g u e s t h a t , b ecause t h e on ly r e a l i s s u e 
b e f o r e t h e j u r y was w h e t h e r he had t h e i n t e n t t > sif\Vl t h e c a t t l e 
t h a t he took from t h e E s p l i n c o r r a l s , h i s c o n v i c t i o n of a t t e m p t e d 
t h e f t i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s b e i n g a c q u i t t e d of a c t u a l t h e f t . 
Defendant u r g ^ s t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n on t h e a t t e m p t c o u n t s must 
t h e r e f o r e be r e v e r s e d . 
Because d e f e n d a n t never c h a l l e n g e d t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n 
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on attempt2 t h i s issue i s not properly before t h i s Court. 
Defendant, in effect , urges tha t his s t ra tegy at t r i a l was "a l l 
or nothing," i . e . , tha t he was e i ther gu i l ty of theft or not 
gui l ty of any crime. His f a i lu re to challenge the jury 
ins t ruc t ion on attempted the f t , however, be l ies t h i s claim. Even 
though he admitted to a l l of the elements of thef t except i n t en t , 
defendant could s t i l l have hoped for conviction of a lesser crime 
if the jury thought him gu i l t y . If defendant did not hope for 
such leniency, then he could have objected to t h i s jury 
ins t ruc t ion on the basis he now ra i s e s on appeal—that the 
evidence did not support acqu i t t a l of the greater crime and 
conviction of the l e s s e r . 
Prior to the j u r y ' s de l ibera t ion at t r i a l , Judge Burns 
asked defense counsel whether he had any objection to the 
in s t ruc t ions t o be given the ju ry . Counsel for defendant 
objected tha t two of h is requested i n s t ruc t i ons , unrelated to the 
present i ssue , had not been given (R. 220-22). "Other than 
t h a t , " counsel s t a t ed , "I have no exception to the i n s t ruc t i ons , 
Your Honor." (R. 222). The jury was then ins t ruc ted t ha t i t 
could find defendant gui l ty of the f t , gui l ty of attempted the f t , 
or not gui l ty (R. 97, 110). Only after the jury rendered i t s 
verdic t of gui l ty on the attempted theft counts did defendant 
compiain t ha t the jury should not have been allowed to find him 
gui l ty of attempted theft (R. 233). 
2 The ins t ruc t ion on attempt i s provided in addendum A of t h i s 
br ief . 
- 6 -
Defendant's f a i lu re to timely object below to the 
ins t ruc t ion given precludes his ra i s ing the issue for the f i r s t 
time on appeal. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) , Utah Code Ann. § 77-
35-19(c) (1982); S ta te v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568r 571 (Utah 1985) 
( fa i lu re to object to ins t ruc t ion at t r i a l precludes challenge on 
appeal); S ta te v. Bare l la , 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986) 
(appellant must indicate from the record tha t he made a proper 
objection below); Sta te v. S tegge l l , 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 
1983) (court wi l l not consider issues raised for the f i r s t time 
on appeal) ; S ta te v. Valdez, 605 P.2d 472, 272 (Utah 1979) 
( ins t ruc t ions not objected to a t t r i a l cannot be raised for f i r s t 
time on appeal ) . 
Nor i s the issue raised of such a nature or magnitude 
so as to jus t i fy invoking the pla in error r u l e . Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(c) , Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-19(c) (1982). The ins t ruc t ion did 
not misstate the law, thus warranting review by t h i s Court. See 
State v. Lesley. 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). Further, i t i s not 
plain error for the court to give a l e sse r included offense 
in s t ruc t ion , even over a defendant 's objection, if warranted by 
the evidence and there i s c lear ly no risk tha t the defendant w i l l 
be prejudiced by lack of notice and preparat ion so as to deprive 
him of a fu l l and fa i r opportunity to defend himself. S ta te v. 
Howeil, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982). Because an attempt i s 
necessar i ly included in every completed offense, defendant was 
not prejudiced by the ins t ruc t ion on attempt. Since defendant 
fa i led to object to t h i s ins t ruc t ion at t r i a l , t h i s Court should 
not consider t h i s issue on appeal. 
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POINT II 
ASSUMING DEFENDANT HAD OBJECTED, THE ATTEMPT 
INSTRUCTION WAS NOT IMPROPER. 
Assuming defendant had t i m e l y o b j e c t e d t o t h e 
i n s t r u c t i o n on attempt
 f this instruction was not improper. 
Defendant argues that a conviction for an attempt cannot stand 
"unless there i s intent to commit a crime and an ineffective act 
done toward i ts commission." Brief of appellant at 10. 
Defendant's argument that the act done toward the intended crime 
must be ineffective is untenable in light of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
4-101(3) (197b), which specifically states, "No defense to the 
offense of attempt shall arise: (a) because the offense 
attempted was actually committed . . . ." See also State v. 
Garnick, 619 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1980). 
Defendant further argues that the jury verdict was 
i l logical since the defendant admitted to committing all of the 
elements of theft except intent and since the jury found 
defendant not guilty of theft, the jury must necessarily have 
found that defendant did not possess the requisite intent for 
attempted theft. 
This Court recently stated in State v. Stewart, 33 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15 (May 1, 1986): 
That the verdict may have been a result of 
compromiser or of a mistake on the part of 
the jury is possible. But verdicts cannot 
be upset by speculation or inquiry into 
such matters. 
Id. at 16, citing Dunn v. United States, 294 U.S. 390 (193 2). In 
Stewart, four inmates of the Utah State Prison were charged with 
second degree muraer in the stabbing death of a fellow prisoner. 
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Two of the four inmates, Stewart and Christensen, were convicted, 
while the other two, Coleman and Dominquez, were acqui t ted . On 
appeal to t h i s Court, Stewart and Christensen argued tha t t he i r 
convictions should be reversed on the ground that the convictions 
were inconsis tent with the acqu i t t a l s of Coleman and Dominquez. 
This Court declared that the issue was not whether the verd ic t s 
were cons is tent , but "simply whether there was suff ic ient 
evidence to support the gui l ty v e r d i c t s . " i d . a t 15. 
Although the issue in t h i s case i s not one per ta ining 
to inconsistency of v e r d i c t s , the reasoning behind many cour t s ' 
refusal to set aside inconsis tent ve rd ic t s i s applicable to the 
ins tant case. 
Courts refuse to inval ida te convictions on grounds tha t 
they are incons is tent with other verd ic ts because courts "have 
always r e s i s t ed inquiring in to a j u r y s thought process [and] . . 
. through t h i s the jury brings to the criminal process, in 
addit ion to the co l lec t ive judgment of the community, an element 
of f i n a l i t y . " United S ta tes v. Powell, U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 
471, 478 (1984). 
Courts also uphold inconsis tent ve rd i c t s , because such 
ve rd ic t s are often a product of the j u r y ' s not-entirely-improper 
des i re for l en i ty toward the defendant. The Supreme Court stated 
in Powell: 
The burden of the exercise of l en i ty f a l l s 
only on the Government, and i t has been 
suggested tha t such an a l t e rna t i ve should 
be avai lable for the d i f f i cu l t cases where 
the jury wishes to avoid an a l l -o r -no th ing 
ve rd i c t . Such an act i s , as the Dunn 
Court recognized, an "assumption of a 
power which [the jury has] no r ight t o 
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exe rc i s e , " but the i l l e g a l i t y alone does 
not mean that such a co l l ec t ive judgment 
should be subject to review. The fact 
tha t the inconsistency may be the r e su l t 
of l e n i t y , coupled with the Government's 
i n a b i l i t y to invoke review, suggest that 
inconsis tent ve rd ic t s should not be re -
viewable. 
105 S.Ct. 477 (c i t a t ion and footnote omit ted) . See also State v. 
Christensen, Utah, no. 20641, s l i p op. a t 3 (October 17, 1986) (a 
j u r y ' s acqu i t t a l of a defendant may resu l t from some compromise, 
mistake, or l en i t y on the j u r y ' s p a r t ) . 
The record of the proceedings below suggest tha t the 
present case very probably involved the type of l en i ty discussed 
by the Supreme Court in Powell. Here, the evidence was 
compelling that defendant had the r equ i s i t e i n t en t , and was 
gui l ty o t , actual the f t . K.C. Coombs t e s t i f i e d t ha t he and 
defendant conspired to take the Esplin c a t t l e without permission 
of the owner (R. 77-a4) . There was persuasive evidence tha t 
defendant could not possibly have been ignorant of the fact tha t 
the taking was unauthorized: he and Coombs had been to the 
Esplin cor ra l s on the very day they took the c a t t l e and had seen 
Mr. Esplin herding the c a t t l e (R. 78, 156); the c a t t l e were taken 
in the middle of the night (R. 80, 163); the two men followed 
deserted back roads on t h e i r way to Cedar City (R. 81 , 162-63); 
and they s to l e another cow tha t had been running loose in the 
auction yard (R. 85, S t a t e ' s exh ib i t s 8-10). Nevertheless, i t 
seems clear from the record that Mr. Coombs was the leader in the 
scheme and the more culpable of the two men; t ha t defendant was a 
follower who would not l ike ly have engaged in such criminal 
a c t i v i t y of his own accord. Further, Mr. Coombs took the money 
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from the sa le and gave defendant only $250.00. There i s a very 
real l ikel ihood that the jury members f e l t compassion toward 
defendant and, in the words of Jus t ice Holmes, assumed a 
pardoning "power which they had no right to exerc ise , but t o 
which they were disposed through l e n i t y . " Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393. 
In rendering i t s ve rd ic t , the jury c lear ly found every element of 
the crime of attempted the f t , including the r equ i s i t e in tent to 
s t e a l (see R. 83-86, ins t ruc t ing the ju ry , in t e r a l i a , that the 
Sta te has "the buraen of proving each and a l l of the essen t ia l 
a l lega t ions in each separate count . " ) . Defendant, never theless , 
endeavors to persuade t h i s Court tha t the jury did not rea l ly 
find tha t he had the in tent to s t e a l . He argues tha t , by 
acqui t t ing him of actual thef t , the jury must have found tha t he 
did not have the intent to s tea l and, therefore , the jury must 
have concluded tha t he did not have the required in tent to 
support a conviction of attempted the f t . In Powell, the Supreme 
Court re jected a similar argument and explained the fal lacy of 
t h i s roundabout reasoning: 
Second, respondent 's argument tha t an ac -
q u i t t a l on a predicate offense necess i t a t es 
a finding of insuff ic ient evidence on a 
compound felony count simply misunderstands 
the nature of the inconsis tent verdict 
problem. Whether presented as an insu f f i -
cient evidence argument, or as an argument 
that the acqu i t t a l on the predicate offense 
should c o l l a t e r a l l y estop the Government on 
the compound offense, the argument neces-
sa r i l y assumes tha t the acqui t ta l on the 
predicate offense was proper—the one the jury "real ly meant." This, of course, i s 
not necessari ly cor rec t ; a l l we know i s 
t ha t the ve rd ic t s are incons is ten t . The 
Government could j u s t as easily—and 
erroneously—argue tha t since the jury con-
victed on the compound offense the evidence 
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on t h e p r e d i c a t e offense must have been 
s u f f i c i e n t . The problem i s t h a t the same 
j u ry reached i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s ; once 
t h a t i s e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l a t e r a l 
es toppel—which a re p r e d i c a t e d on t h e a s -
sumption t h a t the ju ry ac ted r a t i o n a l l y and 
found c e r t a i n f a c t s in reaching i t s v e r d i c t 
—are no longer u s e f u l . 
105 S.Ct. a t 47b -?9 . The S t a t e has n e i t h e r t he l e g a l means nor 
t h e i n c l i n a t i o n t o cha l l enge the j u r y ' s e x e r c i s e of l e n i t y in the 
p re sen t c a se . The S t a t e does, however, urge t h a t defendant 
should not now be heard t o complain t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n s for the 
l e s s e r inc luded offense of at tempt should be reversed on grounds 
t h a t t he ju ry behaved i r r a t i o n a l l y . 
As noted in S t e w a r t , 33 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 15 , t h e r ea l 
i s s u e i s whether the evidence suppor ted the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . By 
examining t h e record t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t t o 
conv ic t the defendant , a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s adequa te ly p r o t e c t the 
accused a g a i n s t i r r a t i o n a l v e r d i c t s . The Supreme Court dec la red 
i n Powell : 
F i n a l l y , we note t h a t a c r iminal defendant 
a l ready i s afforded p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
j u r y i r r a t i o n a l i t y or e r ro r by t h e i n d e -
pendent review of the s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e 
evidence undertaken by t h e t r i a l and ap -
p e l l a t e c o u r t s . 
105 S.Ct. a t 47b. The record evidence c i t e d in t h e s ta tement of 
f a c t s t o t h i s b r i e f , supra a t 1, e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e r e was 
adequate evidence t o support d e f e n d a n t ' s conv ic t i on of a t tempted 
t h e f t . Defendant ' s conv ic t ion should be af f i rmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e foregoing arguments , defendants 
conv ic t ion should be aff i rmed. 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that in every consummated offense 
there must of necessity exist an attempt to commit the offense. 
Stated another way, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit 
a crime if, acting with the culpability otherwise required for 
the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting 
a substantial step toward the commission of the offense, he may 
be guilty of making an attempt to commit such offense. 
Stated another way, if a person with the mental state 
required takes some action of a substantial nature to carry out 
the offense charged but is not successful in carrying out the 
offense to its completion, then, in that event, you may find 
such person guilty of an attempted crime, keeping in mind, 
however, that to sustain a conviction of any offense the 
evidence must bear, in your minds, the convincing force required 
by law. 
You are further instructed that an attempt to commit a 
crime, as above defined, is a lesser but included offense in 
the charged crime. 
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